Abstract-We describe Heraclitus as an example of a stream cipher that uses a 128 bit index string to specify the structure of each instance in real time: each iustance of Heraclitus will be a stream cipher based on mutually clocked shift registers.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper describes Heraclitus, a proof of concept cipher demonstrating the existence of sound dynamic ciphers. It is a stream cipher that uses a 128 bit string to specify each instance in real time.!t can be considered to be a stream cipher with an index dependent structure which can be set up in real time, and can therefore also be a session cipher, that is, a cipher used for a single session and then discarded.
Ciphers with key/index dependent structures, including stream ciphers, have been discussed theoretically [6] , [17] and several have been implemented [12] , [14] , [19] . These ciphers, including the stream cipher Mir-I, use Feistel net works, s-boxes (non-linear transformations) and p-boxes (per mutations). In general, the s-and p-boxes are the only key dependent elements of the cipher. The rest of the structure, such as the number of s-and p-boxes, and the network are considered to be fixed. We construct in this paper a cipher whose structure is completely dependent on the index by using it to determine the number of registers, their lengths and their associated polynomials. As with session keys, any given 'in stance' of the cipher is used for a period and then transformed into another instance of the cipher in an unpredictable manner.
Note that the cipher described in this paper can be imple mented in a number of ways. The initial description provides the most general implementation that can be extended, both in terms of the number of registers used and the register lengths. However, we also present alternative approaches to implementing Heraclitus and variants.
In the next section, we give the background to AS. I. In Sections ill to V, we give a detailed construction of Heraclitus. In Section VI we propose two initialisation modes for Heracli tus, one being suitable in resource constrained environments. Section VII briefly discusses the security of Heraclitus.
II. BACKGROUND
A shift register of length n at discrete time t is a system based on a sequence of bits {rt [i] 2) has a one bit input at time t, st; and 3) at time t + 1:
2:::; i:::; n, and i = 1.
A linear feedback shift register (LFSR) is a shift register that takes its input as a linear combination of the bits of the register; that is:
i=l where {ci}f =l are fixed constants, either 0 or 1. The set ¢> = { i I Ci = I} is the set of feedback bits of the LFSR.
Associated with each LFSR is afeedback polynomial, which is related to the feedback bits. The feedback polynomial is 2: x k + 1.
kEc/>
Every LFSR has a period, which is the time it takes for the LFSR to return to its initial state. If the feedback polynomial is irreducible, the period will be 2 n -1, which is the maximum period.
In most cases, and the cases in which we will be interested, the output of the LFSR is:
. Note that the output may be a nonlinear function of the bits of the LFSR. The Heraclitus family of ciphers is based on the AS. l cipher [S] , and attacks on Heraclitus will be similar to the the attacks on AS. I.
Many attacks on AS. l have been published [8] . The attacks generally follow one of the following strategies.
• Guessing attacks, guess the two shorter registers, and determine the longer register.
• Golic [9] uses a time-memory trade off to recover the initial state of the cipher. If M and T are the memory and time requirements, then M . T 2: 2 6 3 . 3 2 ; thus this attack can be quickened by precomputation.
• Biryukov et al. [4] provide a refinement of GoliC's attack.
They focus on certain special states which produce partic ular patterns. This increases the speed of the attack. This attack requires about 2 4 2 to 2 4 8 steps of preprocessing and data storage and requires a deep knowledge of all aspects of the cipher.
• AI-Hinai et al. [1] applied algebraic attacks to AS. I. Barkan et al. [3] improved the third attack, and Nohl and KriBler [15] have set up Rainbow tables to break AS. l based on a similar approach.
In analysing the cipher, the last attack demonstrates that the clocking mechanisms provide significant immunity to algebraic attacks. The first three attacks have only become feasible in recent years with an increase in processing power and storage space but still face the difficulty of handling large amounts of data. Consequently, these attacks become infeasible if the overall size of the cipher is increased while retaining the essence of the clocking mechanism. This can be done in several ways, such as increasing the lengths of the three ciphers and adding registers to the cipher.
These considerations, together with the observation that AS. l operates in a resource constrained and challenging en vironment, have motivated the authors of this paper to build a strengthened version of AS. I. In addition to the obvious extension to more and longer registers, we propose a novel approach which changes both the number and size of registers used in any one session as well as the polynomials underlying the feedback registers.
From the above description, AS. l is an example of an LFSR based cipher with majority clocking. The parameters of this type of cipher are:
• the key length K' and the number of registers r,
• the length of registers { Pi } where the registers are de noted by {�H=l'
• the feedback bits of the registers, and • the clocking mechanism. With the exception of the clocking mechanism, we vary these parameters in Heraclitus.
III. OV ERVIEW OF CONSTRUCTION
As noted above, the parameters of the cipher that are varible are the number of registers r, the length of registers { Pi } , and the feedback polynomials of the registers. These parameters are specified used a 128 bit string, X called the Index. This is distinct from the key used by the instance of the cipher.
For Heraclitus the key length is fixed to be 128 bits: thus the total register length will need to exceed 128 plus the check bits required to any register having a trivial loading.
Our construction starts with an index which is a 128 bit string X = 6 ... 6 28 , and consists of three steps:
1) selection of number of registers; 2) selection of register sizes; and 3) selection of feedback bits for each register by generating irreducible polynomials. The index X is used for each of these steps.
The majority clocking function used in the AS. l cipher will be used due to its simplicity, to allow reuse of analyses of AS. l, and because it has been extensively analysed alge braically in [1] .
IV. NUMBER AND SIZE OF REGISTERS
The number and size of registers will be determined by the initial bits of the index X. To use the majority clocking function unmodified, an odd number of registers will be used. Another concern is that if the registers are long and relatively few, a significant proportion of the bits, a third or a fifth, may be derived from other bits and the key stream, and therefore be more amenable to analysis.
Consequently, the number of registers will be chosen from { 7, 9, ll } .
The following points were considered in determining the range of the lengths of the registers.
• The sum of lengths of the registers used in any session should equal or exceed the key size, including the check bits. That is:
(1)
i=l
• The lengths of the registers should not present difficulties in implementation either in software or in hardware.
• The register sizes need to be limited to ensure that the algorithms used to determine the feedback bits are tractable.
• The register sizes are not too small to limit the scope for analysis based on a brute force indexing of the smaller registers.
• The register lengths should be pairwise coprime. Most modern operating systems are based on 64 bit reg isters. Moreover, the decryption algorithm used to determine the feedback bits has a complexity of 0(m 3 ), where m is the length of the register: this requires 0(218) operations for registers of less than 64 bits which is feasible for most devices, including resource constrained devices. Consequently, 64 bits is chosen as the upper bound for register sizes.
The minimum size for registers is set to be 17 in order to limit the scope of brute force attacks on these systems.
The requirement that the register lengths are pairwise coprime reduces correlation attacks against the cipher and ensures that the cycle time is maximised [13] . This is certainly seen in most stream ciphers published. Consequently, in our implementation, we chose register lengths to be primes and prime powers. This has the added benefit of simplifying the selection of feedback bits.
We chose the set, ( of possible register lengths to be: This set has 16 elements: however, when using only 7 registers, only the 15 longest are used. Based on a choice of 7, 9 or 11 registers, the first two bits of the index X are used to determine the number of registers. This will also determine the number of possible register lengths. The first 14 bits of X are used to make these determinations. 1) If 66 = 00, then r = 7, which allows C;) or 6435 choices of register lengths. 6 ... 64 are used for 4096 possible register lengths.
2) If 66 = 01, then r = 11, which allows G�) or 4368 choices of register lengths. 6 ... 64 are used for 4096 possible register lengths.
3) If 6 e 2 = 1, then r = 9, which allows C;) or 11440 choices of register lengths. If 13 bits are used to make this choice up to 8192 register lengths can be chosen
In our implementation, a look-up table was used to choose the register lengths. This is an efficient method as the table is used repeatedly and the space needed is minimal.
In choosing the number of registers and the register lengths, care must be taken to ensure that (1) is satisfied.
V. FEEDBACK BITS
The next step is to determine the feedback bits. As discussed in Golomb [10] and in Section II the feedback bits are directly related to the feedback polynomials. Moreover, the feedback polynomials should be irreducible to ensure that each register has maximal cycle length.
Thus, to select the feedback bits for the registers, irreducible polynomials are generated and the corresponding feedback bits for the register are used.
Elements of GF{2 n ) can be used to generate irreducible polynomials of order n over GF (2) . The algorithm chosen to generate the polynomials is outlined in §4.74 of [13] .
Note that GF{2 n ) is isomorphic to GF(2) [x]/p{x), where p{x) is an irreducible polynomial of order n over GF(2).
Consequently, Heraclitus uses a fixed set of irreducible polyno mials to generate feedback polynomials, one for each register, to use this algorithm. These irreducible polynomials Pi were taken from Seroussi [18] . For p prime, all non-trivial elements a of GF{2P) will generate an irreducible polynomial by:
Two elements, a and f3 will generate the same irreducible polynomial if, and only if, there exists. an integer 1 ::; j ::; p such that: f3 = a21 • The collection {a2' } f':� is known as the cyclotomic coset of a [11] .
For q, a prime power, similar properties hold: however, not every non-trivial element of GF{2q) will generate irreducible polynomials -only those elements with exactly q elements in its cyclotomic coset. That is, those elements a for which the smallest integer t such that a2 t = a is q.
In order to use this method to choose irreducible polyno mials from the values of X, there needs to be some way of generating strings of the length of the registers. Ideally, some method of indexing cyclotomic cosets would be used in order that each value of X would generate a different set of irreducible polynomials. However, there is no generalised simply implementable indexing of cyclotomic cosets or repre sentatives from these cosets. The method that we have chosen is to use a one way hashing function to generate bit strings that have the following properties:
• uniform distribution over the strings;
• the correlation between chosen polynomials between reg isters is 0; and
• collisions are difficult to find. The one way hashing function chosen is SHA512, which has these properties. Moreover, it is a standard and many implementations exist, including for constrained environments. This will provide a 512 bit string in which substrings of the appropriate lengths can be chosen.
The method for choosing the feedback bits for the register of length n is as follows.
1) Take the first n unused bits of SHA512{X).
2) If it corresponds to a trivial element, set Qn = Pn.
3) Else, if n E {25, 27, 32, 49} test the string. If it does not generate an irreducible polynomial, discard the first bit and concatenate the first unused bit of SHA512{X). If the test fails three times, set Qn = P n as the default feedback polynomial. 4) Else generate irreducible polynomial Qn. 5) Set the feedback bits to correspond with Qn.
Each polynomial generation will have a running time of O{m 3 ) operations. Note that an upper limit of three attempts to generate an irreducible polynomial is set. This is to ensure that the polynomial will be generated within a known amount of time.
Two concerns exist for the generation of irreducible polyno mials (a) the proportion of irreducible polynomials generated, and (b) significant bias of polynomials generated.
For all registers, the probability that a particular irreducible polynomial will not be generated using this method is less than 2-85: for polynomials of order 17, this probability will be significantly less. This indicates that a large proportion of the set of irreducible polynomials will be generated.
The algorithm will introduce a small bias for the default polynomial to be generated. For a prime, p, the default will occur at a rate of {p+2)2-P, the other polynomials occur at a rate of p . 2-p • For a prime power, q = p n , the default polyno mial will occur at a rate of about (p + 2)2-q + 2-3 (q-q/p-l).
These increases are small and will not introduce a significant bias, and therefore will not provide significant assistance to an attacker.
VI. IRREGULAR CLOCKING AND INITIALISATION
The clocking mechanism is the one that is used for A5.1:
that is, majority clocking based on fixed bit positions in the LFSRs. In A5.1, the clock bits are at the centre of the registers. There appear to be a number of good reasons: the primary one seems to be that this position is furthest from the output and therefore most difficult to correlate.
Thus, for each register, R." the clocking bit is chosen to be
where j = III Ri II /2 J, that is, about the middle bit.
For stream ciphers, synchronicity is essential for correct function. In harsh environments, such as radio interfaces, traffic will be lost, which poses a problem for stream ciphers and other mechanisms requiring synchronicity. This is usually addressed by putting the traffic into frames and assigning frame numbers or other identifiers for the frame. Many ciphers, e.g. AS.1 and RC4, incorporate the frame number into the session key. Thus, for each frame, the frame number may be XORed or appended to the session key and loaded into the cipher and used for the traffic of that frame.
However, this incorporation may lead to weaknesses using the cipher, in particular related IV attacks [6] , [7] , [16] . This is usually addressed by running the cipher for a fixed number of clock cycles to ensure that sufficient diffusion of the key bits and IV occurs.
An alternative to this is to put the IV and session key through a hash function such as SHA1 and to load the registers with the output of this hash function.
In resource constrained environments using hash functions may not be possible, and other mechanisms to avoid related IV attacks are required. Consequently, two initialisation modes are proposed for Heraclitus: Hash mode and Run mode; noting that Hash mode is preferred when it is possible. Both assume that the session key is K = 1\;1··· 1\;128 and IV is the initialisation vector or frame number or sequence number.
For Hash mode, the string kf = SHA512(K, IV) is generated. The initial R bits of the string k f are loaded into the cipher, where R is the total length of the registers. The registers are loaded from the shortest to the longest register.
The remaining bits of k f are discarded. Then the complement of the parity of each subkey of each register is loaded to avoid the null loading.
For Run mode the key for the frame is generated k f = K EB IV, IV being padded by repetition until it is 128 bits long. This is divided into subkeys, depending on the number of registers: 1) for 7 registers: k1··· k18, k19··· k36, k37··· k54' k55· .. k72, k73 ... k90, k91 ... k109, and k110· .. k128; 2) for 9 registers: k1··· k14, k15··· k28, k29··· k42' k43 ... k56, k57· .. k70, k71 ... k84, k85 ... k98, k99 ... k113, and k114 ... k128; 3) for 11 registers: k1··· kl1' k12··· k22, k23··· k33, k34 ... k44' k45 ... k56, k57 ... k68, k69 ... k80, k81 ... k92' k93·· . k104' k105 ... k116, and k117·· . k128 .
Each subkey has a parity bit appended to prevent a null loading. The subkeys are loaded into each of the registers, starting with the smallest going to the longest.
The cipher is then run to ensure that every bit in the registers is dependent on every key bit and frame bit, which will provide resistance to related IV attacks. Majority clocking will ensure that each register moves about half the time, then running the cipher for three times the length of the longest register will ensure that this condition is met. For simplicity, 183 is used in all cases to ensure this.
The advantage of Hash mode is that the key loaded into each frame is generated by a hash function, and therefore even if an attacker were to determine the key for one frame, the keys for the other frames are protected by the hash function. However, hash functions require significant processing that may not be available in low resource environments. Although Run mode does not have this protection, experience with AS.1 and other ciphers indicate that this an effective mechanism to protected the cipher.
The fact that the key and IV are used to determine the structure of the cipher in the next 2 64 frames adds to the unpredictability of future set-ups and consequently provides security against attacks.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The security of Heraclitus was analysed briefly. The follow ing are the initial conclusions of the analysis.
• Due to the increase in key length, guessing attacks are not feasible.
• The time-memory trade of attacks of Golic are not feasible due the increase in key length and the number of registers [9] .
• The refinements of GoliC's attack are not feasible [3] , [4] . This is due to the increased key size, thus requiring fea sible precomputation: moreover, there are a large number of register number and length combinations, making the search for patterns and refinements more difficult. Each combination will require its own precomputed data.
• Each cipher within Heraclitus is immune to algebraic attacks due to the non-linear clocking. Thus, Heraclitus is immune to algebraic attacks [1] .
• Each cipher within Heraclitus is independent of and uncorrelated with the other ciphers.
Each instantiation of Heraclitus is therefore immune to the known attacks against AS. l. However, possible weaknesses in transitions between instantiations are not yet fully known. For this reason, the authors have lodged the code at the ECRYPT Benchmarking of Cryptographic Systems (eBACS http://bench.cr.yp.to/) for general testing by the cryptographic community.
VIII. IMPLEMENTATION
One of the practical concerns for any cipher is the imple mentation of the cipher -either in hardware or software. Va riants of Heraclitus have been implemented in software, two of which are described briefly: the first by the second author, and the second by a group of undergraduate students in 2008 as a group project [2] .
These implementations demonstrate that the method is ex tensible and adaptable, that it is implementable, and that it is usable. A brief description of Heraclitus-64 is given below.
The description of Heraclitus given here is very general, and a number of variants can be made. A variation of Heraclitus, which we call Heraclitus-64, was implemented in June 2008. In this version:
• the index is restricted to 64 bits;
• the number of registers is either S or 7, selected by 1 bit;
• the set { 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 32, 37, 41, 43,47, 49} is used for the register lengths;
• the register sizes are chosen by an 8 bit string which is stored in a Thus, the total storage required is less than 200 kB. How ever, any particular instance of the cipher will need less than lOkB of space to run. This compares favourably with the 1 MB (runtime) and 8 MB (total) required by AS+.
IX. EFFICIENCY
The efficiency of a cipher is dependent on the implementa tion and the resources required to implement the cipher, and the context in which it is being implemented.
The complexity of the algorithms specified is at most cubic in the length of the register -i.e. O(n 3 ) : and n ::; 64. This presents a small overhead in setting up the cipher, and indicates that the register lengths can be increased significantly in this type of cipher without a large performance impact. However, with the availability of cheap memory on most standard PCs and servers, pre-computing these algorithms and implementing the algorithms as look-up tables provides signif icant time and implementation efficiecies. This is demonstrated by the choices made in implementing Heraclitus-64 and AS+.
Heraclitus has not been implemented in hardware. However, there are some observations for a hardware implementation:
• each register of Heraclitus will need three physical reg isters to implement it -one to act as a register, one for the feedback bits and one as a length mask;
• the algorithms to determine the feedback bits can be either implemented as look ups, as for software, or implmented as the algorithms described.
Although the tables take up significant memory, this can be reduced for hardware implementation, as in Heraclitus-64.
X. CONCLUSIONS
Heraclitus demonstrates that ciphers with key dependent structures can be extended to LFSR based stream ciphers, and that each instance can be implemented in real time.
In describing Heraclitus, an extension of the AS. l cipher, we wrote algorithms to specify the parameters of the ciphers such as register lengths and feedback taps. These algorithms all run in at most cubic time (O(n 3 ), and n ::; 64. An adaptation of Heraclitus was implemented which uses up to 91 bits for an index and at most eight table lookups and 2MB of stored data. This implementation is suitable for resource constrained environments.
The design of Heraclitus exploited the choices available in cipher design, such as the choice of irreducible polynomials or the choice a function which satisfies certain conditions. They also represent an increase in strength of the ciphers because: (a) each cipher generated is designed to satisfy particular criteria to ensure the strength of the cipher; and (b) each cipher is expected to be only used once -therefore it is infeasible to determine any weakness, even if the cipher is known.
Heraclitus is only one example of this type of approach: it can be extended and adapted to other stream ciphers. Further investigation into key dependent block ciphers and hashing functions is currently underway.
